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KYBERNETIKA- VOLUME 24 (1988), NUMBER 6 
A NOTE ON NONAXIOMATIZABILITY 
OF INDEPENDENCE RELATIONS GENERATED 
BY CERTAIN PROBABILISTIC STRUCTURES 
IVAN KRAMOSIL 
There exist such systems of random variables that the set of all true assertions, concerning 
the statistical independence of subsystems of random variables and expressed in the terms of 
a relational calculus, cannot be derived from an effectively decidable (i.e. recursive) set of axioms 
by the usual deduction rules. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a probabilistic structure Q = {X ;] i 6 r , i.e. a system of random variables 
parametrized by a parametric set J, with each X ; taking an abstract probability 
space <£2, Sf, /*> into a measurable space <Y;, s4>?. From the probability theory 
point of view, the complete characterization of the structure Q is given by its simulta-
neous probability {distribution) PT, defined on <XierY;, Xlels4?) when setting, 
for each system {E;} ieI, E ; e sit, of sets 
(1) Pj(X;sfE;) = fi{ n {to: co e Q, Xi(co) e Et}) . 
iel 
For every 0 =t= A c I the marginal probability PA is defined in the same way, 
just replacing {X;] isI by its subsystem {X,"
1
 ieA. Evidently, for each H A c J and 
each system {Et} isA, 
(2) P^(Xi&4E,.) = P.(X,.6,F,), F, = E ; for ieA, 
Ft = Y( for iel - A. 
Pairwise disjoint subsets {A;)teB, 0 =j= At a I, are called statistically {stochastically) 
independent, if the substructures QA. = {Xj}JsA. of Q are statistically (stochastically) 
independent, i.e., for each E ; e XJeA.s/j, PU/t,(X.eBBi) = I I
 P^i(^0- The structure 
ieB ieB 
QA is completely independent, if all singletons of A are statistically independent; 
in such a case the system of marginal probabilities defined by all singletons of A 
defines uniquely the simultaneous probability PA. 
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If card Yj = m for each i e I and card / = n, then the computation of Pf requests, 
in the worst case, to compute Pj(x) for m" values x from X ;eIY ;, and this problem 
is known to be NP-complete. On the other side, in the case of complete independence 
just m . n values must be obtained (the values P{i}(y) for each i e / and y e Y). 
Supposing that the values for Pt are not computed, but estimated from random 
samples, the situation in the general case is still much worse and we usually have 
not data enough to estimate Pr(x) for all x e X;e/Y; at a reasonable confidence level. 
Hence, the potential statistical independence of some subsets of / may significantly 
reduce the computational complexity connected with the computation or estimation 
of P, and may also simplify decision making for the purpose of which PT is to be 
obtained. 
The problem to decide, whether two sets A, B cz I, arr statistically independent 
or not is theoretically very simple, at least for finite sets J and Y;. The only we have 
to do is to verify the equality PA^B = PAPB for all possible argument values, but this 
may be rather complicated, either from the computational complexity point of 
view, or in case the values of PAuB, PA and PB are to be statistically estimated. So 
the idea has been suggested (cf. [3], e.g.) to find such logical relations among the 
statistical dependences of various pairs A, B <= I, that having verified the independ-
ence for some pairs A, B, the independence of other pairs could be derived by purely 
logical means, i.e. without references to the values of the corresponding marginal 
probability measures. The aim of this paper is to show that in spite of some non-
negligible successes achieved in this direction, this goal cannot be satisfied in general, 
i.e., for certain probabilistic structures Q the corresponding relation of statistical 
independence cannot be completely described in such a "deductive" way. 
2. VALIDITY AND PROBABILITY OF STATISTICAL INDEPENDENCE 
RELATIONS 
First of all, we need a formal language <£?'̂  to describe the statistical independence 
relation generated by a probabilistic structure Q = \X^iel. 
Individual indeterminates (we use this term in order to keep the expression 
"variable" free for the context "random variable") are A, B, C,..., possibly with 
indices, and they are interpreted as to range over the space 0>(l) of all subsets of/. 
Individual constants are I, the name of the parameter set/, 0, the name of the empty 
subset of/, and, supposing that / is finite or countable, then for each i el, {/] is 
also an individual constant - the name of the singleton subset of / containing 
just the element ('. 
Two binary functions are u and — with their usual set-theoretic interpretation 
(set union and set difference), more set-theoretic functions can be defined a posteriori. 
Terms are defined in the usual inductive way: individual indeterminates and 
individual constants are terms and, supposing that s and t are terms, s u t and 
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s — f are also terms (the same being valid for the other functions possibly defined 
through the two basic ones). 
The only relation of the language S?'# is the binary relation J hence, elementary 
formulas are of the form J(s, t), where s and t are terms. Elementary formulas are 
formulas, if F and G are formulas and A is an indeterminate, then "IE (negation 
of E), E v G (disjunction) and(VA) E(for all A. . .) are formulas, other connectives 
and existential quantifier may be extra-defined in the common way. Let L(.f) denote 
the set of all formulas of the language S? f. 
Each probabilistic structure Q = {X ;},eJ generates a model or interpretation 
Ji(Q) of the language S?s as follows. 
The support M(Q) of Ji(Q), i.e. the set in which the indeterminates take their 
values, is the set SP(l) of all subsets of the parameter space I. 
Individual constants I, 0 and {i}, iel are interpreted as the particular subsets 
of / as mentioned above, also binary functions u and — are interpreted as the 
above introduced set operations. Hence, each term of S?s can be unambiguously 
interpreted as a subset of/ supposing that all indeterminates occurring in the term 
are interpreted as subsets oil. 
Let s, t be terms of S? <?, let <p be a mapping (evaluation) ascribing a subset of / 
to each indeterminate occurring in s or in t, let <p(s), <p(t) be the subsets of/ ascribed 
to s and t by this evaluation. Then the elementary formula ,f(s, t) is defined to be 
satisfied in Ji(Q) (by Ji(Q), to hold in Ji(Q), to be valid or true in Ji(Q)) with 
respect to <p, if <p(s) and cp(t) are statistically independent subsets of/ ( = /((?)), in 
symbols 
(3) Ji(Q), <P |= •*(-> 0 ^ %(.)-*.) = *«* P*o • 
The definition of meta-relation |= is extended to other formulas of S?j according 
to the Tarski classical definition of truth predicate (cf. [4]). I.e., for E, F eL(f), 
for an indeterminate A and for an evaluation <p of indeterminates from E and E, 
Ji(Q), cp | = n E iff Ji(Q), cp | = E does not hold, Ji(Q), <p\=EvF iff either Ji(Q), 
<p\=E or Ji(Q), cp\=F, finally, Ji(Q), <p\=(VA) E iff Ji(Q), <p\=E for all evaluations 
(p~ ascribing the same values as cp to all indeterminates from E other than A. The rules 
for other connectives and for the existential quantifier can be easily completed. Hence, 
if E e L(J) n Sent, i.e. if E is a sentence (a formula without free indeterminates) 
of S?j, then either Ji(Q)\=E or J((Q)\=~]E. Let us define the set of true sentences 
of Sfjf with respect to Q by 
(4) Tr(£?j, Q) = {E: E e L(J) n Sent, Ji(Q) \= E} . 
This expression defines a subset of L(J) in a semantical way, referring to the 
meanings ascribed to the symbols of S?# and to the relation of statistical independence 
defined in 0>(I) x SP(l) through the probabilistic structure Q. Syntactically defined 
subsets of L(J) are those defined through the relation of logical consequence. If 
Ax is a subset of L(f), then Cn(Ax) c L(J) denotes the subset of all formulas 
which are derivable from formulas in Ax by the usual deduction rules (say, modus 
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ponens, generalization and substitution into propositional tautologies). A subset 
Ax c L(J) of formulas is called recursive, if its characteristic function defined 
on L(^) is recursive, i.e., Ax is recursive, if there is an algorithm (effective procedure) 
deciding for each E e ZL /) , whether E e Ax or not. 
Now, the relation J = $(Q) of statistical independence, generated by a probabil-
istic structure Q = {X;},e7, is defined to be axiomatizable, if there exists a recursive 
subset Ax c L(J) of axioms such that 
(5) Sent n Cn(Ax) = Tr(Ja?>, g) . 
The following assertion is almost trivial. 
Fact 1. If Q is a probabilistic structure with a finite parameter space I, then 
the corresponding statistical independence relation J is axiomatizable. 
Proof. If I is finite, then every subset A <= / can be expressed by the term U {''} 
ieA 
of <£j. There are 2 2 c a r d / elementary formulas J(s, t) with different pairs of term 
values <s, t} and syntactical equality of terms is decidable. Moreover, each formula 
of the form (VA) E is equivalent to the finite conjunction A E(S), where E(S) 
Seg>(I) 
results from E by replacing A with the term S = U {i}> and this equivalence is 
ieS 
decidable. Hence, every formula from Tr(££s, Q) is decidably equivalent to a formula 
from a recursive set of formulas from L(J) without quantifiers, so that Tr(<£'s, Q) 
is also recursive and can serve, trivially, as a set of axioms. • 
Fact 1 cannot be extended, in general, to infinite parameter spaces. This negative 
assertion follows almost immediately from the existence of nonaxiomatizable binary 
relations over infinite domains. However, for the reader's convenience, and in order 
to make him familiar with a standard proof technique, rather seldom applied in the 
field of probability theory and mathematical statistics, we shall devote the next 
chapter to a more detailed construction and proof. 
3. THE MAIN ASSERTION 
First of all, let us introduce the notion of Peano arithmetic (PA) which will be 
of crucial importance in what follows. The language S£PA of P A contains an infinite 
sequence x, y, z, xu yy, z „ ... of individual indeterminates, one individual constant 
0 (zero), two binary function symbols + and . (addition and multiplication), one 
unary function symbol S (successor), and the binary relation = of equality. The 
elementary terms 4- (x, y) and . (x, y) will be written in the usual infix form x + y 
and x . y, other terms are defined inductively in the usual way. Elementary formulas 
are s = t (again, the infix form is preferred) for terms s and t, other formulas are 
also defined inductively in the usual way. Axioms of PA are those of pure first-order 
predicate calculus, those for equality relation (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity), 
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and the following ones: 
(Al) (V*)(VjO(S(x)«SGO-**-.v), 
(A2) H(3x)(S(x) = 0 ) , 
(A3) (Vx) (x + 0 = x ) , 
(A4) (Vx) (Vy) (x + S(y) = S(x + y)), 
(A5) (Vx) (x . 0 = 0) , 
(A6) (Vx)(Vy)(x.S(y) = ( x . y ) + x ) , 
finally, for each formula \j/(x) of ££PA we have the following induction axiom 
(A7) (0(0) A (Vx) ty(x) => 1//(S(x)))) => (Vx) </,(*) • 
The deduction rules are the usual ones of the first-order predicate calculus. 
An interpretation of PA is defined by setting a set At ranged by the indeterminates 
(the elements of At are called natural numbers), by defining two binary operations, 
addition and multiplication, on At, by defining a unary operation of successor on 
At and by setting the zero element 0 in At. The equality relation is interpreted as 
identity in At. Every interpretation of PA together with an evaluation of indeter-
minates defines uniquely the set of valid elementary formulas of the form s = t 
with terms s and t. By the usual inductive way described above we define the set 
of all sentences of PA which are true under the interpretation in question. Consider 
only such interpretations under which all axioms of PA introduced above are true 
formulas and denote by Tr(PA) the set of all formulas of $£PA which are true under 
all interpretations with this property. The following fact is nothing else than a re-
formulation of the famous Godel incompleteness theorem. 
Fact 2. There is no recursive set Ax of formulas of ^PA such that Cn(Ax) = 
= Tr(PA). 
Having borrowed the greatest Godel's result, we shall not hesitate to make still 
another profit of his results introducing the notion of Godel numbers or Godel 
enumerations in their classical simple form. Each formula of J§?'PA is a finite sequence 
of symbols (letters) from a finite alphabet, supposing that indexed indeterminates 
are taken as subsequences consisting of x, y, z and of numerals 0, 1, . . . , 9. Consider-
ing an ordering of these elementary symbols, we may ascribe to each symbol a its 
(positive)index q(d) with respect to this ordering. Let pu p2,... be the sequence of 
all prime numbers in the increasing order, i.e. p t = 2, p2 = 3, p3 = 5, ... To 
each finite sequence a = aia2 ... a„ of symbols we may ascribe its Godel number 
gn(a), setting 
(6) gn(a) = gn(ala2 ... a„) = f j pf"
j). 
. 7 = 1 
Evidently, given a formula of SCPA, its Godel number can be effectively computed. 
On the other hand, given a positive integer n, we may effectively decompose it into 
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the product of primes in corresponding powers, we may inspect, whether all primes 
up to some pn occur in this expression and if it is the case, we may verify, whether 
the sequence of corresponding powers yields a formula of SSPA or not. Hence, we 
may effectively verify, whether a given positive integer n is the Godel number of 
a formula of S£PA or not. Finally, set 
(7) G -> GN(Tr(PA)) = {gn(a): a. e Tr(PA)} , 
i.e. G is the set of Godel numbers of all true sentences of PA. Now, we have at hand 
everything we need to state and prove the main assertion. 
Theorem. There exists a probabilistic structure Q with an infinite countable para-
meter space I such that the corresponding statistical independence relation J is not 
axiomatizable. 
Proof. Take J = {0, 1, 2,...} and consider a sequence QG = {X}}f=0 of random 
variables defined on an abstract probability space <£2, Sf, fi} taking their values 
in the binary set {0, 1} and satisfying the following conditions: 
(8) fi({co: coeQ, X0(co) = 0;) = fi({co: coeQ, X0(co) = 1}) = J , 
if j e G, then the random variable X} is statistically independent of X0 and 
equally distributed as X0, 
if j el — G, then the corresponding conditional probabilities read 
(9) fi({co: coeQ, Xj(co) = 0}j{co:co e Q, X0(co) = 0}) = p, 
(10) fi({co: coeQ, X}(co) = 0}j{co: coeQ, X0(co) = 1}) = 1 - p 
for some p, \ < p < 1, with complementary probabilities for Xj(co) = 1 in both 
the cases. Hence, random variables X0 and Xj are statistically independent iff/ e G, 
in other way written J((QG) |= </({0], {j}) iff/ e G, hence, Ji(QQ)\=f({0}, {gn(<p)}) 
iff cp e Tr(PA). 
However, we have arrived at this conclusions by a deductive way, hence, our 
constructions concerning the probabilistic system QG and the Godel enumeration 
gn can be converted into a finite set of axioms Ax0 such that (Ax0 1- r]/ means that 
xj/ e Cn(Ax0)) 
(11) Ax0 I- ^ ({0}, {gn(cp)}) o gn(<p) e G , 
and 
(12) Ax0\-(gn(cp)eG)=>cp. 
Now, supposing that the relation J' generated by QG were axiomatizable, we have 
a recursive set of axioms Axt c S£'$ such that 
(13) Axx^J({0},{gn(cp)}) 
iScpe Tr(PA). Hence, taking the set Ax0 u Axx of axioms (and rewriting the axioms 
from Ax1 into the language S£PA), we obtain a recursive set Ax of axioms such that 
Ax \- cp if cpe Tr(PA), hence, Cn(Ax) = Tr(PA) and we have arrived at a contra-
diction with Fact 2, so that no axiomatization Axx for J
2" = S?(QG) exists. • 
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4. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The proof just presented deserves, perhaps, some more comments. The existence 
of a set G such that the predicate x e G is axiomatizable in the framework of a given 
formalized language can be proved more simply and more directly from the cardinality 
reasonings. The set of well-formed formulas of each formalized language, as a set 
of finite sequences over finite or countable alphabet, is also countable. A recursive 
set of axioms is uniquely defined by a recursive function taking the set of all formulas 
into {0, 1} and ascribing the value 1 just to the axioms. The number of recursive 
functions is countable (each recursive function is defined by a finite program over 
a finite alphabet), hence, there are only countably many axiomatic systems within 
the given language and, consequently, the set of subsets of J = {0, 1, 2 , . . . } , for 
which the membership predicate is axiomatizable, is also countable. However, the 
space 0>(l) of all subsets of J is not countable, so that the existence of G c I with 
nonaxiomatizable membership predicate immediately follows (in order to take a par-
ticular G with this property for further considerations, the application of the axiom 
of choice is inevitable). In a sense, almost all sets from 0>(l) have the same property 
as G. Or, let V be a random variable taking a probability space <£2, Sf, p.) into 
&>(I), such that n({co: o) e Q, V(co) = E}) = 0 for all E e 0>(l), then evidently (an 
appropriate cr-field is supposed to be defined on 
(14) fi({co: coeQ, V\ e VfaJ1 is not axiomatizable}) = 1 . 
The random variable Vcan be easily defined, say, by a sequence V0, Vu V2,... of 
independent and identically distributed random variables, taking <J2, Sf, \i) into 
{0, 1} and such that 0 < [i({co: co e Q, Vt(co) = 1}) < 1, the only we have to do is 
to set 
(15) V(co) = {j:J e / =- {0, 1, 2, . . . ] , Vj(a>) = 1} . 
On the contrary to this "existential" consideration, in the proof presented above 
a particular case of the set G is given which is, in spite of the nonaxiomatizability 
of its membership relation, definable in semantical way. 
Let us close this paper by a short reconsidering of Fact 1, The existence of an axio-
matization of the independence relation for finite parameter spaces follows almost 
trivially, on the other hand, the problem to find a shorter more sophisticated axiom-
atization (than those given by an exhaustive listing of non-equivalent quantifier-less 
true formulas) is far from being trivial and may be of theoretical and practical 
significance. The same holds when discussing about the aim to find some common 
properties possessed by all independence relations generated by probabilistic struc-
tures in question, or at least by probabilistic structures with finite parameter spaces; 
some interesting results in this direction have been achieved, e.g., by Studeny [5] 
and Matiis [2]. Such general properties of statistical independence relations may 
serve for a meta-axiomatization of the notion of statistical independence, but cannot 
provide a complete axiomatization for all particular independence relations generated 
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by particular probabilistic structures. Hence, there is no general algorithm yielding 
axiomatizations for all probabilistic structures parametrized by finite sets of integers 
just as particular instances of an axiomatization for an infinite parameter space, 
So, for infinitely many cases of probabilistic structures with finite parameter space, 
a creative effort will be necessary to obtain an axiomatization of the corresponding 
independence relation. 
The paper is almost self-explanatory up to references dealing with the Godel's 
incompleteness theorem (Fact 2), the details can be found in any textbook on mathe-
matical logic and we introduce [4] as the probably most accessible one in our country. 
Also the most elementary references on probability theory can be found in any 
textbook, let us mention [1] or [6]. 
(Received January 18, 1988.) 
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